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ABSTRACT
In the context of the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), a
proliferation of wireless connectivity can be expected. That
ubiquitous wireless communication will be hard to centrally
manage and control, and can be expected to be opaque to
end users. As a result, owners and users of physical space are
threatened to lose control over their digital environments.
In this work, we propose the idea of an IoTScanner. The
IoTScanner integrates a range of radios to allow local re-
connaissance of existing wireless infrastructure and partic-
ipating nodes. It enumerates such devices, identifies con-
nection patterns, and provides valuable insights for techni-
cal support and home users alike. Using our IoTScanner,
we attempt to classify actively streaming IP cameras from
other non-camera devices using simple heuristics. We show
that our classification approach achieves a high accuracy in
an IoT setting consisting of a large number of IoT devices.
While related work usually focuses on detecting either the
infrastructure, or eavesdropping on traffic from a specific
node, we focus on providing a general overview of operations
in all observed networks. We do not assume prior knowledge
of used SSIDs, preshared passwords, or similar.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the context of the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), a
proliferation of wireless connectivity can be expected, with
predictions reaching as many as 500 smart devices per house-
hold in 2022 [17]. Heterogeneous smart devices that re-
quire transparent Internet connectivity need to be integrated
into a common infrastructure. In particular, communication
standards such as Zigbee, Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy,
and WiFi are expected to provide such infrastructure either
as mesh networks, or traditional single-hop access points.
Often, vendors will sell their own application gateway with
integrated access point, which to a certain degree hides the
underlying communication from the owner. Although wire-
less communications have many benefits in terms of usabil-
ity, flexibility, and accessibility, there are also security con-
cerns [34]. Among those concerns are privacy and in general,
controllability. With this growth in the size and complexity
of wireless networks, appropriate tools are required to better
understand the environment’s wireless traffic.
In this work, we propose the idea of an IoTScanner. The
IoTScanner is a system that allows for passive, real-time
monitoring of an existing wireless infrastructure. The IoTScan-
ner classifies and identifies devices that are communicating
using the infrastructure and traffic patterns among the par-
ticipating devices. The IoTScanner will supply this infor-
mation in a structured manner so as to provide valuable
insights for technical support and home users alike.
While related work usually focuses on detecting either the
infrastructure, or eavesdropping on traffic from a specific
node, we focus on providing a general overview of opera-
tions in all observed networks. We do not assume prior
knowledge of used SSIDs, preshared passwords, or similar.
In addition to this, the IoTScanner operates passively, with-
out active probing or other transmission. Our emphasis is
also on providing real-time analysis and visualization of the
scanned network, unlike some related work that focuses on
offline analysis.
We note that we do not consider physical layer effects
such as collisions and packet loss, goodput, or interference
between networks in this work. We leverage recent develop-
ments in the area of cheap software-defined radio modules
to handle the physical layer of the wireless traffic to provide
the Link layer traffic. As most wireless communication stan-
dards nowadays by default encrypt the Link layer payload,
we consider only Link layer traffic for analysis in this work
(without considering higher layer traffic). In particular, we
aim to address the issue of providing controllability and pri-
vacy to the user of an IoT environment. The IoTScanner
can provide details on the devices, the links between them
and the amount of traffic in any environment in which it is
placed. This information can then be used to classify and
identify devices that could impact the privacy of the user.
Three communication standards (WiFi, Bluetooth Low En-
ergy (BLE) and Zigbee) are considered in this work.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We identify the issue of opaqueness in IoTs:integration
of heterogeneous IoT devices will lead to a plethora of
wireless standard and networks operated in parallel.
Without a system like the IoT scanner, it will be diffi-
cult to keep overview of communication in a space (in
particular for third-party networks).
• We propose an abstract system design that allows to
seamlessly integrate a range of radio devices with a
scanning server. The server’s data can then be ac-
cessed by users through a RESTful API. The data ob-
tained via the REST API can then be used for visual-
ization of the scanned environment and further analy-
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sis.
• We present an implementation of the proposed design,
and demonstrate its effectiveness through a set of ex-
periments.
• We discuss how our system can be potentially used to
identify privacy threats in an IoT environment.
The structure of this work is as follows: In Section 2, we
briefly summarize the relevant background for our work. We
propose our system design for the IoTScanner in Section 3.
Our implementation is described in Section 4. In Section 5,
we run some experiments to evaluate our implementation
in an environment that consists of WiFi devices. In addi-
tion, we discuss the feasibility of the IoTScanner to perform
traffic classification and device identification in this section.
Sections 6 and 7 describe experiments in BLE and Zigbee
environments. We discuss some of the challenges we faced
in Section 8. Related work and comparison of features with
existing tools is summarized in Section 9. We conclude the
paper and discuss possible future work in Section 10.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a network of phys-
ical devices that have the capability of gathering and trans-
ferring data from the environment, and interacting with re-
mote computers over Internet [4, 18]. IoT devices can be
anything from cellphones to smart lamps, as long as they
have the ability to transfer data over the Internet, which es-
sentially means they are assigned some public IP addresses.
2.2 Passive Monitoring
Passive monitoring is a technique for observing the traffic
in a network only by listening to signals that are already
available in the network, without injecting any extra signal.
Unlike active monitoring, passive monitors do not probe the
devices they are observing [22]. In the context of wireless
network, the technique is more suitable as it only requires
a traffic interceptor to be physically present in the envi-
ronment, without requiring any wire tapping or so. Devices
called sniffers or monitors are placed in the network to inter-
cept frames transmitted by devices in their vicinity. Radios
that can be used to sniff different standards (WiFi, Blue-
tooth, Zigbee) are available on the market and can be used
for passive monitoring.
2.3 System Model
In our systems model, we assume that there are one or
more wireless networks in an IoT scenario in which the scan-
ner is placed. For example, in a smart home the electronic
gadgets like smart lighting can make use of Zigbee commu-
nication, personalized health monitoring can use Bluetooth,
Internet access can happen via WiFi communication. The
scenario can have one or more IoT devices, but not all the
devices need to be active (i.e., sending or receiving some
information) all the time. For example, a smart blood pres-
sure monitor may get activated only about 2-3 times a day,
whereas smart light need to be active throughout the day.
In the basic operation mode, the scanner needs no prior
knowledge of the infrastructure and network configuration
in the IoT environment, i.e, no information is required about
which device used for what purpose, or what kind of encryp-
tion is used by them, if any. We assume that the user of our
IoTScanner system does not have any control over the de-
vices, or know if they are present or where exactly they are
located. Hence, there is a chance that IoT devices that are
present in the environment (but not actively participating
in the network) are not detected by the scanner.
2.4 Attacker Model
We assume a limited attacker who is honest but curious.
For example, the attacker might access a webcam set up in a
room to spy on persons in the room, but the attacker will not
set up a dedicated device for this (in particular, the device
will not use some non-standard wireless communication).
By obtaining the images from the camera over a certain
time period, the attacker violates the privacy of the user.
How the attacker obtained access to the camera does not
matter for our analysis.
As we do not assume that we have control over the net-
work(s) in the environment, we will not be able to detect
the camera activity on the Network Layer or at a gateway
or similar.
3. A PASSIVE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
In the following we provide details on our proposed pas-
sive analysis framework. We start with a concise problem
statement, summarize the intuition behind our design and
then provide additional details on individual components.
3.1 Problem Statement
In this work, we address the following problem: “In an IoT
environment, which devices are present, and communicating
via wireless communications?” That information can then
be used to address questions such as: “Are the IoT devices in
my environment used by an attacker to violate my privacy?”
Ideally, such a goal should be reached passively, without
actively interfering with the environment (which could be a
public place such as an airport, hotel, or similar).
This problem cannot be solved by normal end-users easily;
it requires specific software, hardware, and technical under-
standing of wireless protocols. We refer to this challenge as
wireless opaqueness for the end users: they are agnostic to
the way networking works, which links exists, and how data
flows in the neighborhood.
3.2 Intuition
To address the problem stated above, we now propose the
IoTScanner. The aim of the IoTScanner is to provide real-
time, passive monitoring of an existing wireless infrastruc-
ture that potentially constitute an IoT environment. The
scanner will identify active devices that are communicat-
ing using that infrastructure, and attempt to categorize IoT
traffic depending on features such as the volume of traffic
observed.
In particular, we use to following constraints to achieve
passive monitoring. The IoTScanner:
• will not associate with any access point present,
• will not perform active probing or fingerprinting, and
• will not decrypt the observed network traffic.
Traffic Interceptor Traffic Analyzer Data Storage Visualizer
Figure 1: Overview of the IoTScanner architecture,
which consists of four modules: traffic interceptor,
traffic analyzer, data storage, and traffic visualiza-
tion.
The IoTScanner only observes the network traffic at the Link
layer, and then analyzes this traffic using frame header in-
formation. A more offensive active scanner would not need
to follow those constraints.
The long term goal is to turn the IoTScanner into a con-
venient hand-held device. In the context of this paper, we
are using a Raspberry Pi 3 [31] as platform, together with
devices such as Android tablets for visualization via a web
application.
3.3 IoTScanner: System Architecture
The main features provided by our IoTScanner are ubiqui-
tous (wireless) signal interception, packet filtering, analysis
of the captured packets, and storage of the results. Finally,
results will be accessible via APIs to be visualized through
a web-based visualization system.
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of our proposed
Passive Analysis Framework, termed as IoTScanner. The
IoTScanner has four main functional modules: traffic inter-
ceptor (captures wireless signals), traffic analyzer (analyzes
MAC frames), data storage (stores processed frames and re-
sults), traffic visualizer (displays the status of network).
Each of these modules is described in detail in the follow-
ing. We provide a detailed comparison of the IoTScanner
with other related projects in Section 9.
3.4 Traffic Interceptor
The traffic interceptor module provides flexible low level
access to the wireless medium. In the context of IoT, widely
used protocols are 802.11/WiFi, Bluetooth, Bluetooth LE,
Zigbee, and Z-Wave; each being prevalent in particular ap-
plication area(s). For example, the devices accessing In-
ternet primarily use WiFi, wearable/on-body devices (e.g.,
blood pressure monitor, smart watch) use Bluetooth or Blue-
tooth LE to connect to their parent devices, smart home
appliances (e.g., smart meter) use Zigbee, and electronic
appliances (e.g., AC, fridge, fan) use Z-Wave protocols [4].
However, there is no clear line of separation on what device
can use which protocol, it primarily depends on the usage
of the devices or the energy consumption behavior of them.
Therefore, it is important to have interception capabilities
leveraging multiple radios, either one radio for each proto-
col, or software defined radios to cope up with the variety
of protocols available in the IoT spectrum.
If multiple channels of the same standard should be reli-
ably monitored, it might even be necessary to use multiple
radios of the same kind, each on its own channel.
3.5 Traffic Analyzer
The traffic analyzer scrutinizes each Link layer frame, cap-
tured by the traffic interceptor, by parsing only the frame
overhead (i.e., header and trailer) harnessing on passive anal-
ysis philosophy of the IoTScanner. It extracts relevant infor-
mation, such as the source and destination addresses, frame
type and sub-type, SSIDs present, from those the frames
to be used for targeted analytics. We note that the frames
need to be treated on a protocol by protocol basis, because
parsing Bluetooth LE frames is significantly different from
parsing WiFi frames or Zigbee frames. In addition, the ana-
lyzer records some additional useful information such as the
channel number on which the interceptor is capturing traf-
fic, size of the frame captured (in bytes) and the timestamp
at which the frame is captured. It sends the extracted frame
information to the data storage module on per frame basis,
where actual analytics is performed.
3.6 Data Storage
The data storage module, acting as a simple server, pro-
vides a stable storage unit primarily for storing processed
information about individual frames. The storage can be
done by various means, however we prefer to employ a sim-
ple and light weight database system. In addition to storing
the information, the system provides a simple interface for
querying the database to carry out analytics. For exam-
ple, the data storage interface can be realized using a set of
RESTful APIs that can easily accessed over Internet, and be
used by third-party applications. The APIs are provided for
the following functions: storage and retrieval of frame infor-
mation, generalized categorical queries on the DB, storage
and retrieval of analysis results.
3.7 Traffic Visualizer
The traffic visualizer provides a visual representation of
the observed IoT environment at a particular time window.
A network, i.e., an IoT environment, can be viewed from
different perspectives, starting from device-to-device connec-
tion to device or link specific information to semantics of the
underline, possibly collaborative, activity performed by IoT
establishment. In this paper, we consider a mix of all these
perspective at a high level for an initial comprehension of the
IoT environment where we display a graphical view of the
underlying network along with some supporting description
of the devices and the associated links, if any. We do not
infer any application specific information, e.g., if the IoT is
used for maintaining room temperature by controlling AC,
rather our interest in this paper is to create an inventory
of the devices present and the amount of traffic generated
by each of those devices. Because the devices need not be
sending or receiving frames all the time, the traffic visual-
izer needs to automatically and periodically update to reflect
any changes (in terms of both the devices and links) in the
IoT environment under surveillance. Note that the visual-
izer displays only those nodes, and accounts for only those
links that are present in the database currently.
4. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present our implementation of the four
proposed IoTScanner modules (traffic interceptor, traffic an-
alyzer, data storage, and traffic visualizer). An overview of
our implementation is shown in Figure 1. We use different
wireless interfaces for the traffic interceptor, Scapy (a python
library) for the traffic analyzer, SQLite for the data storage,
and Javascript for the data visualization. The data storage
uses RESTful APIs to communicate with the analyzer and
the visualizer modules. The interceptor and analyzer com-
ponents run on a Raspberry Pi 3 device, the data storage can
be run on the same device or a server, and the visualization
is displayed on an Android Tablet.
4.1 Traffic Interceptor
The traffic interceptor module can be implemented by a
number of radio interfaces or by using software defined ra-
dios. We decide to use the following radio interfaces that are
commercially available, and connectable via USB: the TP-
Link TL-WN722N 802.11n wireless adapter (for WiFi), the
Ubertooth One (for Bluetooth LE), and Atmel-RZUSBstick
(for Zigbee).
The TP-Link TL-WN722N adapter [36] can be easily con-
figured to operate in monitor mode and capture WiFi frames
with configurable channel hopping (over 13 channels). The
adapter can also support certain active attacks such as deau-
thentication attacks, a useful feature in case we extend the
functionality of the IoTScanner to include traffic decryp-
tion. We perform sequential channel hopping to obtain an
overview of the traffic on all channels. The interface dwells
on a particular channel for a certain period of time before
hopping to the next channel. The dwell time can be config-
ured by the user, otherwise takes a default constant value.
We note that since we dwell on a single channel at a time,
frames on channels the interceptor is not listening on will
not be captured. Hence, we capture a subset of the overall
traffic.
For Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) traffic capture, we use
the Ubertooth One [29], an open source Bluetooth moni-
toring platform. Compared to other Bluetooth monitoring
solutions, this platform is inexpensive and easily adaptable
to our settings. We focus on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
traffic as its presence is increasing in IoT devices, especially
those used in healthcare. The Ubertooth One is able to
detect the channel hopping map from sniffed BLE connec-
tion request packets and follow connections by hopping in
the same pattern. The Ubertooth also has a promiscuous
mode—to follow connections that were already established
at the time of sniffing. As in the case of WiFi, the intercep-
tor may miss out some devices as result of channel hopping,
which may be compensated by increasing the observation
period.
For Zigbee traffic capture, we use the RZUSBstick from
Atmel [3] which supports low power wireless applications
using Zigbee, 6LoWPAN, and IEEE 802.15.4 networks. This
adapter can also perform channel hopping (over 16 channels,
from channel 11 to channel 26 in the 2.4 GHz band). Other
features of this traffic capturing procedure is similar to WiFi
or Bluetooth networks.
4.2 Traffic Analyzer
The traffic analyzer module consists of three sub-modules:
extractor, collector, and storage handler, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The extractor and the collector modules are imple-
mented using Scapy [6], a python library for packet cap-
ture and analysis. Every frame captured by the traffic in-
terceptor is an input to both the extractor and collector
sub-modules. Since the aim of the IoTScanner is to pro-
vide a quick overview of the IoT environment, only rele-
vant pieces of information are extracted from every captured
frame. This is performed online (without buffering) so as
to find quick answers to only those questions that we have
assumed to be sufficient to provide an overview of the envi-
ronment. The extractor module extracts the following from
the respective frames:
• In WiFi frames (type, sub-type, length, MAC address
and SSID)
• In Bluetooth LE frames (type, length, MAC address
type (public or random), MAC address, node local
name)
• In Zigbee frames (type, length, PAN ID, addresses )
The collector module collects information such as the sys-
tem time during frame capture, the channel number on which
the frame is captured, and the RSSI (for potential device
localization). Both of these modules supply the captured
information to the storage handler module.
The storage handler sub-module sends the collected and
extracted information to the data storage module. It sends
the frame information (in JSON format) to the data stor-
age module via HTTP POST method. The module also
has the option of storing the frames in a PCAP file and pe-
riodically sending the files to the data storage for further
analysis of the overall traffic (which might be more compu-
tationally intensive). It is worth mentioning that high level
frame analysis is not possible at the traffic analyzer since
this requires aggregated information from multiple frames,
and hence such analysis is performed at the data storage
server end.
4.3 Data Storage
The data storage module of the IoTScanner provides a
database server, to be accessible via a set of APIs, to store
and retrieve the extracted/collected frame information. Two
modules, the traffic analyzer and the traffic visualizer, inter-
act with the storage module using these APIs over network,
potentially the Internet. We have implemented this module
as a web server which interacts with a light-weight database.
The APIs in the server are developed using Flask (a Python
web framework), which helps to easily build the RESTful
APIs for our purpose. We use SQLite to build a light-weight
relational database system for our data storage module.
4.4 Traffic Visualizer
We implement the traffic visualizer using Javascript with
D3 [7] library for network visualization. The visualizer is
compatible with any hand-held devices, such as smart phones,
tablets, etc. in addition to the desktop browsers. The vi-
sualizer displays the IoT environment in a number of ways
(e.g., summary text, connectivity graph, bipartite relation,
etc.) to make it suitable for the user to understand different
aspects of the underlying network. By default, it displays a
network graph accompanied by a brief summary text.
Figure 4 shows a sample network graph obtained during
one of our experiments. The colored circles represent the
nodes in the network and the arrows between a pair of nodes
indicate that the pair exchanged at least one frame. We
identify the access points from beacon and probe request
frames and internet gateways using simple heuristics. The
access points and gateways have icons to identify them in
the visualizer.
Figure 2: Overview of IoTScanner implementation.
Figure 3: Traffic Analyzer module of our IoTScan-
ner, for WiFi frames.
Our visual display is interactive in the sense that on se-
lecting a node or an edge, more details about the selected
component are displayed. For example, in the Figure 4, the
selected nodes and edge are highlighted in red and their de-
tails are displayed in the sidebar. The graph is updated at a
fixed interval of p (configurable) seconds in order to reflect
any changes in the number of devices or the communication
links in the network.
Our overall implementation using the Raspberry Pi as in-
terceptor (along with the tablet as visualizer) is shown in
Figure 5.
5. WIFI EXPERIMENTS
In all our experiments, we place the scanner in an IoT
testbed [33] that contains a number of IoT devices. We
conduct experiments with devices that use WiFi, Bluetooth
Low Energy and Zigbee communication, with a larger focus
on WiFi enabled devices since it is the predominant mode
of communication for IoT devices. We perform our exper-
iments in three phases after grouping the devices based on
networking technology. In this section, we discuss the exper-
iments using WiFi enabled IoT devices. Experiments with
BLE and Zigbee are described in Sections 6 and 7.
5.1 IoTScanner configuration
The IoTScanner, while intercepting WiFi traffic, uses two
Figure 4: Example screenshot of our visualization
app: IoT scenario represented using a graph struc-
ture. Selecting a node (red circle) in the graph dis-
plays the details about the underlying device.
input parameters,
• Dwell Time (Td): period of time (in seconds) that the
traffic interceptor listens on a channel before moving
to next channel (Td ∈ 5, 10, 20, 30(default), 40, 50, 60).
• Hops Th: number of channel hops performed by the
traffic interceptor (Th ∈ 1, 6, 13(default), 26, 65, 130).
These parameters account for the amount of time the
IoTScanner is exposed to an IoT environment; for exam-
ple, Th = 13 and Td = 5s implies that the traffic interceptor
scans for 13 × 5 = 65s, and the analysis will be performed
only on the traffic captured during this period.
5.2 Evaluation metrics
Following are the common metrics for our experiments:
• nodes: the total number of active devices in the ob-
served environment (including access points). A de-
vice is considered to be active if it is observed to have
sent/received at least one frame.
• links: the number of unique pairs of nodes that have
exchanged at least one frame (excluding broadcast and
multicast frames).
• SSIDs: the number of access points seen in the envi-
ronment.
Figure 5: IoTScanner with visualization on a hand-
held device.
• Frames: the total number of frames (sent or received)
per device; these are further classified by type into
cFrames (control), mFrames (management) and dFrames
(data).
• Bytes: the aggregated number of bytes (sent and re-
ceived) per device; these are further classified by type
into cBytes (control), mBytes (management) and dBytes
(data)
5.3 Experiment Settings
In our controlled experiments, we use six IoT devices: one
Nest Cam security camera, one Netatmo camera (with face
recognition feature), one TP Link security camera (of rela-
tively lower resolution compared to the other two cameras),
one Amazon Echo wireless speaker, one desktop with wire-
less adapter (to perform general web surfing), and one WiFi
access point. We conduct 10 experiments each, in a high-load
(being default setting) and a low-load setting.
High-load. This is the default setting for our experiments,
and in this setting, all three cameras (focusing on the same
area) are actively streaming video via Internet to a mobile
device located outside the test environment. The Amazon
Echo [2] loudspeaker is streaming audio songs continuously
during the experiments. The desktop with wireless adapter
is used to browse web pages intermittently.
Low-load. In this setting, all the devices are present but
none of them are actively used. For example, the IP cameras
are switched on, but the live video is not accessed. The
Amazon Echo is kept on but is not playing any music.
Understanding the Network Structure. First, we ver-
ify if IoTScanner can identify the nodes (with their MAC
addresses) and the links among them from the captured
traffic, hence determining the underlying network structure.
We observe that our IoTScanner can correctly capture traf-
fic from all the six devices in each of our experiments. The
scanner identifies the devices that sent out broadcast frames
to advertise their presence in the network, and the wireless
channels on which each of these devices sent/receive traffic.
We experiment with various values (as noted earlier) of the
two input parameters, dwell time (Td) and hops (Th). We
Label Device Name
Dev-1 Desktop
Dev-2 Netatmo camera
Dev-3 TP-Link camera
Dev-4 Access Point
Dev-5 Gateway
Dev-6 Amazon Echo
Dev-7 Nest Cam camera
Table 1: Device labels and the corresponding de-
vices used in WiFi experiments.
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Figure 6: Variation of amount of traffic per device
(subplot (A) in Bytes, and (B) in Frames) in high-
load setting.
observe that lower values of these parameters result in the
scanner being unable to capture all the devices during the
observation window. After multiple rounds of experiments,
we conclude that Td = 30 and Th = 13 are optimal values to
quickly capture a sufficient amount of traffic for the traffic
classification analytics we want to perform. Finally, we use
beacon and probe request frames to identify access points in
the network, and simple heuristics (on amount of data and
destination MAC addresses) to identify the Internet gate-
way.
Results of these experiments are not presented here, as
they are used more as a check of the correctness of our
IoTScanner system. We present more interesting results
that are obtained from the traffic analyzer of our system
on device classification in an IoT environment.
5.4 Per-node Traffic Classification
We perform simple analytics on the captured traffic to
classify IoT devices. The mapping between the device labels
we use and their actual name is shown in Table 1.
Frames, mFrames, cFrames, and dFrames. First, we
find the total amount of traffic associated with each device
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in the network, along with the type (management, control
and data) in the high-load setting. We determine the traffic
in terms of bytes (Figure 6A) and frames (Figure 6B). A
frame is associated with a device if its MAC address is found
in the frame either as the source or destination address.
Interestingly, it can be seen that the traffic amount and
its type can classify the devices at a high level. For exam-
ple, the highest amount of traffic, in terms of both bytes
and frames, is associated with Dev-4 which is the access
point (see Table 1) that connects to all other devices present.
Dev-5, which has no control and management frames, is the
gateway device connected through Ethernet to the access
point. The lowest amount of traffic is seen in Dev-1, the
desktop, and it is used for occasional browsing during the
experiments. The rest of the devices (Dev-2, Dev-3, Dev-6
and Dev-7) are associated with high traffic as they are ei-
ther IP cameras or the Amazon Echo performing continuous
streaming. In each of the devices, it can be seen that the
data traffic (in bytes) dominates the control or management
traffic, and is almost equal to the total amount of traffic of
the corresponding devices. However, the difference between
the number of control and data frames is not as high, es-
pecially in the case of the cameras. We observe that the
acknowledgement frames contribute to the large number of
control frames in this case.
We explore the traffic volume in low-load settings (results
shown in Figure 7). It can be seen that almost all the devices
have control traffic comparable to data traffic (in bytes), as
opposed to high-load settings where data traffic dominates
the control traffic. In fact, standard deviation of traffic vol-
ume is quite significant in this setting in all the devices,
perhaps because the devices send their status information
more at times. Thus, an analysis of the traffic amount and
its composition can potentially be used to learn if an IoT
setting generates a high volume of data traffic.
Sent and Received Volume. Since the overall traffic
mainly consists of data frames, we investigate the amount
of data traffic (in terms of bytes and number of frames) sent
and received by each device (Figure 8 shows results in high-
load settings). The highest amount of traffic (either sent
or received) is observed in Dev-4, which is the access point.
Dev-5 (the gateway) has about three times higher received
traffic (in Bytes) as compared to sent. Note that the traffic
towards the Internet is the received traffic for the gateway,
and traffic coming into the local network accounts for sent
for it. Thus, the result is consistent with the ground truth,
as there are three cameras sending video traffic. We also no-
tice that the cameras (Dev-2, Dev-3 and Dev-7 ) have a high
amount of sent traffic, as expected. However, the amount of
sent traffic varies significantly among the cameras. The re-
ceived traffic is higher than the sent traffic for Dev-6, which
is the Amazon Echo continuously streaming and playing au-
dio songs from its server. Our experiments indicate that
active IoT devices such as IP cameras or music streaming
devices can be identified by analysis of sent and received
traffic volumes in high-load settings.
We also investigate traffic flow in the low-load settings
(results shown in Figure 9). Surprisingly, it can be seen that
cameras do not necessarily produce a higher amount of sent
traffic compared to receive traffic (e.g., Dev-2). The Amazon
Echo sends and receives almost equal amount of data in this
setting. As expected, the gateway still receives more data
than it sends, probably because these IoT devices continue
to update their status to their associated cloud servers.
Sent-to-Received Ratio. We explore the possibility of
identifying the devices by computing the ratio of sent to
received traffic (in terms of both bytes and frames). We
consider only data traffic for this analysis, and ignore man-
agement and control frames. Figures 10A and 10B show the
sent-to-received ratios in high-load and low-load settings re-
spectively. In the high-load setting, the IP cameras (Dev-2,
Dev-3 and Dev-7 ) have a ratio greater than 4 for traffic in
bytes and greater than 1.5 for traffic in number of frames.
This indicates that an IP camera that actively streams video
traffic may potentially be identified when the ratio is greater
than 1.0. Also, the ratio in bytes is greater than the ratio in
frames for the cameras, implying that, per frame, a larger
amount of data is originated from the cameras. The desk-
top with adapter (Dev-1 ) has a lower ratio (>1.0) than the
cameras but higher than the access point (≈ 1.0) and gate-
way (<1.0). The ratio of frames is much higher than the
ratio in bytes, which indicates that the desktop sends more
number of frames of smaller size. The access point can be
clearly identified as it has a ratio close to 1.0 for both bytes
and frames. The gateway (Dev-5 ) has a ratio less than 1.0,
which indicates higher received traffic. Finally, the Amazon
Echo (Dev-6 ) shows a ratio less than 1.0; as it continuously
downloads audio traffic from the Internet.
In the low load setting, the sent-to-receive ratio does not
look promising as a metric to classify the devices. The ratio
does not behave in the same manner for all the IP cameras
- Dev-2 has a ratio less than 1.0, while Dev-3 and Dev-7
have a higher amount of sent traffic. The Amazon Echo has
a ratio higher than 1.0 in this setting. Our experiments show
that an analysis of the ratio alone in low-load settings may
not be good enough to identify IoT devices.
5.5 Classifying Streaming Camera
Finally, we present a use case of our IoTScanner system
Figure 8: Variation of the number of frames and
its types for each participating device in high-load
setting.
Figure 9: Variation of the number of frames and
its types for each participating device in low-load
setting.
that addresses the issue of privacy in an IoT environment. In
particular, we show how to differentiate nearby IoT cameras
that are streaming data from other devices. To achieve that,
we leverage our experience on traffic patterns as discussed
in previous sections. It may be tempting to consider abso-
lute traffic volume per device for the classification as any IP
camera produces a lot of traffic compared to other devices
(Figure 6). Unfortunately, there are a number of poten-
tial issues with that approach. The traffic volume can vary
significantly depending on the observation window size. In
addition, as different wireless channels can be used to carry
traffic and our scanner performs channel hopping, it may not
be able to capture all traffic for each and every device. The
camera can also produce varying amount of traffic depending
on its vendor (see Figure 8). Finally, the identification may
become dependent on system parameters such as dwell time
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Figure 10: Variation of the ratio of sent and received
traffic, per device basis in both high- and low-load
settings.
Table 2: Confusion matrix to identify streaming
camera, “others” = devices other than cameras.
n = 95 classified as camera classified as others
camera 10 2
others 3 80
and hops. Therefore, we consider ratio on different types of
traffic volume as it looks promising (see Figure 10).
We perform this analysis only on data traffic as it domi-
nates control or management traffic in high-load settings for
all the devices (Figure 6).
We use two parameters here:
• Rsr - the ratio of sent to received data traffic, i.e.,
Rsr = Trs/Trr, where Trs and Trr are the amount of
data traffic (in Bytes) sent from and received respec-
tively by a device.
• Rbf - the ratio of the traffic volume in bytes and in
frames for a device, i.e., Rbf = Bytes/Frames where
Bytes and Frames are the amount of traffic in bytes
and the frames respectively, as defined earlier.
Our experimental setup consists of the three IP cameras as
before and some additional WiFi enabled devices like smart-
phones, laptops, tablets, and a printer. We run eight exper-
iments in total, having a varying number of active devices
with at least one active camera in each experiment. We have
a total number of 95 devices spread over all the experiments.
The goal is to classify the cameras that are actively stream-
ing. The status (active or non-active) of a camera is not
changed during a single experiment though it may change
across different experiments.
Results from the previous experiments give us an Rsr
range of 12±8 and an Rbf range of 1000±500 bytes/frame.
Thus, a device is identified as an actively streaming cam-
era in an experiment only if it satisfies the conditions 4.0 ≤
Rsr ≤ 20 and 500 ≤ Rbf ≤ 1500. In each of the experi-
ments, we calculate the Rsr and Rbf for every device, and
check if they can be identified as a streaming camera, oth-
erwise it is identified as a non-camera device (denoted as
“others”). The results of these experiments are shown in a
confusion matrix in Table 2. We see that out of 95 device
identifications, there were 3 false positives and 2 false nega-
tives. This gives a false acceptance rate (FAR) of ≈ 3.61%
and a false rejection rate (FRR) of ≈ 16.67%.
False positive identification of one device occurs due to the
presence of one Withings IP camera in our test settings. The
camera is kept switched on and configured, but no remote
access of live video is performed during the experiments.
Hence, it is considered as a non-camera device. However,
the camera starts streaming to its associated cloud server
as soon as it detects some movement in the area of focus,
causing it to be detected as an IP camera. Similarly, a cou-
ple of false negative cases are reported due to the Netatmo
camera in our settings. This is because our scanner fails to
sniff sufficient traffic for the device, as it performs channel
hopping, making a false prediction case.
As the aim of our study is to defend against an “honest
but curious” attacker that makes use of existing networking
infrastructure to obtain insights about not only the IoT in-
frastructure itself but also human users associated with it,
e.g., by accessing a surveillance camera, we use only MAC
layer un-decrypted traffic for this purpose. Preliminary re-
sults of our analysis on identifying such streaming cameras
in an IoT environment are promising and can lead to future
studies for identifying other devices from MAC layer traf-
fic obtained by passive sniffing. Thus, our IoTScanner can
play an important role for initiating the process of address-
ing the problem of identifying potential privacy breaches in
any personalized IoT environment.
6. BLUETOOTH LE EXPERIMENTS
For the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) experiments, we
consider six devices - a OnePlus smartphone, an August
smart lock, two Fitbits, and two Lenovo tablets. The smart-
phone operates the smart lock via an Android app. Each
tablet is associated with a Fitbit, and operates it via an An-
droid app. In each experiment, one of the Fitbit is paired,
allowed to sync its data and unpaired from the associated
tablet; the smart lock is also paired, locked and unlocked
(3-4 times) via commands from the app, and unpaired from
the smartphone. Similar to the WiFi experiments, we con-
duct 10 experiments in each case, and compute an average
of each of the measures. We do not attempt to decrypt the
frames in these experiments as well.
We initiate experiments to probe our network settings by
detecting BLE nodes and links. Then, we attempt to clas-
sify the devices via traffic categorization. It is seen that
out IoTScanner is able to detect all three pairs of devices
and their links. Surprisingly, we observe that the smart lock
advertising frames do not follow BLE MAC address random-
ization (i.e., a feature expected to be used by BLE devices
for privacy reason where the device MAC is replaced with
some random MAC in the BLE frames). In the Fitbit case,
we do not detect advertising frames (refer to Section 8),
hence no information regarding MAC randomization is re-
vealed. During the data exchange phase, the access address
is seen to change every time the smart lock is paired. The
Fitbit pairs use a single access address across all pairing
events. Hence, the access address can be used to identify
the Fitbit-tablet communication.
In the smart lock case, we observe three types of con-
trol frames in addition to the advertising and data frames
(BTLE DATA). Those are scan request (SCAN REQ), scan
response (SCAN RESP), and connection request (CONN REQ)
frames. No such control frames are seen in the Fitbit case.
In both cases, we observe that the data frames (observed
on non-advertising channels) are further classified into data,
control, and reserved sub-types. We denote the control sub-
type frames as data-control (see Figure 11) .
We observe traffic on all data channels in the case of the
Fitbit, except for a few experiments where only one channel
is seen to be carrying traffic. However, for the smart lock,
only about 4 channels on average carry traffic.
We present the results on the data and control traffic per
BLE pair in Figure 11.
Both the Fitbit pairs generate significantly higher data
traffic when compared to the smart lock (the inset figure
shows a magnified version that displays data-control frames).
This is expected as Fitbits perform a number of actions like
movement detection, quality of sleep estimation and loca-
tion information collection during every syncing with the
phone, whereas the smart lock exchanges only lock/unlock
commands. The variation in data traffic for the Fitbit can
be explained by the differences in user activity for each ex-
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bit devices, and Pair-3 is smart lock device (inset
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Table 3: Label-device mapping for Zigbee experi-
ments.
Label Device Name
Zig-1 Bulb - switched on and off once
Zig-2 Hue Bridge
Zig-3 Bulb - changed color
Zig-4 Bulb - switched on and off multiple times
periment (relation between traffic and activity are described
in [12]). Our experiments show that BLE pairs can also be
classified using traffic volume analysis, though this is not
done here due to insufficient number of devices at the time
of experiments.
7. ZIGBEE EXPERIMENTS
For the Zigbee experiments, we employ the Philips Hue
lighting system that consists of one Hue bridge controlling
three light bulbs. We intercept the traffic among the four
devices and find the number of links, nodes and amount of
traffic on each link. We conduct 10 experiments in total.
In each experiment, we execute different commands on the
three bulbs—one bulb is switched on and off once during
the experiment, one bulb is switched on and off 6 times
and one bulb is made to change its color 6 times. Each
experiment lasts 120 seconds. The devices are labeled as
shown in Table 3.
In all the experiments, our traffic interceptor detects all
four devices (results are not presented here). We concentrate
on the identification of devices using traffic analysis.
Figure 12 shows the amount of data sent and received by
the four devices (each indicated by Zig-i). We note that the
Hue bridge (Zig-2) sends and receives a higher amount of
data (in size and number of frames) when compared to the
light bulbs. Among the light bulbs, the bulb with the lowest
amount of activity (switching on and off once), i.e. Zig-1,
has a smaller number of sent and received frames.
The results also show that the controller receives about
40% more data than it sends, whereas the bulbs have about
50% less data received compared to sent. These initial tests
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Figure 12: Variation of sent and received data (A)
bytes and (B) frames of four Zigbee devices, one
Philips Hue controlling three associated light bulbs.
show that an analysis of data sent and received can become
a potential metric for device classification. It can be used to
distinguish a light controller from its associated lights and
might even help detect the amount of activity on the lights.
8. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some of such challenges here
that we have faced during our experiments.
We observe that our wireless access point (LinkSys E1200)
exposes two MAC addresses through the WiFi interface on
certain occasions (for example, during our low-load exper-
iments). On scrutiny, we discover that these are the ad-
dresses of the WiFi and Ethernet interfaces. Our traffic an-
alyzer module does not currently have a mechanism to cor-
relate multiple MACs to the same access point. In addition,
when we use the OnePlus smartphone to interact with the
IP cameras, we observe that the IoTScanner detects multi-
ple MAC addresses communicating with the camera despite
the absence of other devices in the environment. Further in-
vestigation reveals that the Marshmallow Android OS used
by the smartphone creates random MAC addresses to inter-
act with the access point. Thus, it is important to devise a
mechanism to detect multiple MAC addresses as belonging
to a single device.
During our BLE experiments, we observe that the smart
lock uses standard advertising BLE channels 37, 38 and 39
to send control frames. Out of these, the connection request
frame reveals the channel hopping sequence that is to be
used during the data exchange phase. Therefore, the de-
fault “follow connection” mode of Ubertooth, which uses the
connection request frame to follow connections, can be used
to detect this BLE pair. However, we do not observe com-
munication initiation on the usual advertising channels for
the Fitbit. Hence, we had to use the “promiscuous” mode
of the sniffer, which estimates the hopping sequence from
frames on the data channels. This indicates the need to
introduce pair specific sniffing policy in the case of BLE.
In addition, we notice that the Android applications of
the BLE devices do not exhibit the same behavior. The
smart lock application does not connect to the lock when the
Bluetooth pairing is performed manually instead of through
the application, probably indicating some security measures
at the application level. However, the Fitbit application
works even if the pairing/unpairing is performed manually
during any Fitbit operation (such as syncing). We do not
observe similar issues while working with Zigbee devices.
9. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present work that is related to the
problem of monitoring complex wireless networks, including
passive and active sniffing systems.
WiFi monitoring. In [21], Kotz and Essien used syslog
messages, SNMP polling and tcpdump packet captures to
characterize WLAN usage on a college campus over a period
of 77 days. Henderson et al. [19] built upon the work of [21]
by capturing traces, including VoIP traces, from a larger set
of access points and users. In these works, the packets were
captured by associating with access points and the trace
analysis was done offline.
Davis developed a passive monitoring framework in [13] to
measure resource usage on 802.11b networks, and used it to
analyze various setups involving video streaming. Further
work on resource usage during streaming was done in [27]
and [26]. Yeo et al. implemented a wireless monitoring sys-
tem in [38], using multiple sniffers that produced a merged,
synchronized trace which could be used for Link layer traffic
characterization and network diagnosis. They also discussed
the possibility of using anomalies in Link layer traffic for se-
curity monitoring. The challenges posed by analyzing traces
from multiple sniffers was further explored in [23] and [9].
In [23], the authors introduced a finite state machine to infer
missing packets from a distributed system of sniffers. In [9],
the authors focused on large scale monitoring by utilizing
150 monitors to capture 802.11 frames. LiveNet [8] used
multiple sniffers to monitor sensor network deployments by
reconstructing routing behavior and network load from cap-
tured traces. In [8], the authors proposed algorithms for
route inference and topology reconstruction among nodes in
a network and provided visualization of the network topol-
ogy and data transfer. Chhetri and Zheng introduced the
WiserAnalyzer in [10]—a passive monitoring tool to capture
wireless traces and infer relationships among nodes in the
network. Our proposed IoTScanner aims to provide simi-
lar visualization but in real-time and for a larger number
of protocols. In comparison to these papers, where analysis
of the collected data was done offline, our work focuses on
real-time passive analysis.
A real-time passive monitoring framework was developed
by Benmoshe et al. [5] and deployed on a university cam-
pus. Details such as number of clients, channel, error rate
etc. were stored in a database and a map of active devices
was built. They provided some visualization in the form of a
map of active devices. In contrast to [5], our work does not
have prior knowledge of the network setup. SNAMP [37] was
a multi-sniffer and multi-visualization platform for wireless
sensor networks that could perform capture and visualiza-
tion in real-time. Our work aims to enhance some of the
features mentioned in these systems, with the introduction
of APIs for easy access to data, more visualization features
and monitoring of other protocols (Bluetooth and Zigbee).
Kismet [20] is one of the most widely used real-time, pas-
sive sniffing tools. It is targeted at monitoring 802.11 net-
works but offers plugins for Bluetooth and Zigbee traffic
capturing. Though it provides some analysis in terms of enu-
merating the wireless networks, hosts and amount of data it
sees, higher level analysis has to be done manually. In ad-
dition to this, Kismet does not have a detailed visualization
tool. Some tools have been built on top of Kismet, mainly
for the purpose of visualizing the node locations (using GPS
plugins) but several of them are no longer maintained and
use outdated libraries. Wireshark [11] is also a well known
tool for passive analysis. Like Kismet, it has plugins to han-
dle Bluetooth and Zigbee captures. However, it does not
have the provision for automated, detailed analysis or visu-
alization of the observed network. The IotScanner shares
many features with Kismet and Wireshark but hopes to en-
hance the user experience with more analysis and visualiza-
tion tools. We compare a number of features of our system
with related existing tools mentioned above. An overview
of the features present in the IoTScanner and other tools is
shown in Table 4.
Fingerprinting. Franklin et al. [16] performed passive fin-
gerprinting of 802.11 drivers by analyzing the durations be-
tween probe request frames sent by different drivers. This
approach was fine-tuned in [14] to distinguish different op-
erating systems using the same driver. Pang et al. [30] iden-
tified four metrics that would help identify users from a net-
work trace, out of which three could be used even with link
layer encryption. These works use different metrics from
ours for classification. Frame size is one of the factors in [30]
but they investigate this only for broadcast frames, while our
work focuses on size and directionality of data frames.
BLE monitoring. Spill and Bittau [35] developed an open-
source single channel Bluetooth sniffer, BlueSniff, that could
discover the MAC addresses of Bluetooth devices. The Uber-
tooth has a larger set of features at lower cost when com-
pared to BlueSniff. Ryan [32] built a tool to sniff Blue-
tooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication, on the Uber-
tooth platform. This tool is also able to follow connections
that were already established at the time of sniffing. He im-
plemented a traffic injector to demonstrate passive attacks
against BTLE. The BTLE sniffing is now part of the Uber-
tooth project and we utilize it for the IoTScanner platform.
Albazrqaoe et al. [1] presented the BlueEar system, a sniffer
that is also based on Ubertooth but tries to identify and im-
prove the factors that degrade sniffing performance. They
also discuss the implications of privacy leakage in BLE de-
vices and the importance of developing tools for BLE sniff-
ing. While the focus of the BlueEar system is on sniffing
Classic Bluetooth, our work deals with BLE communica-
tion. Privacy in BLE communication of fitness trackers was
explored in [12]. They used the local name parameters in
BLE advertising packets to detect fitness trackers. They also
discovered that fitness trackers send a large number of adver-
tising packets and do not randomize their MAC addresses,
making them vulnerable to tracking. They analyzed data
packets from Fitbits and concluded that the volume of data
sent can be correlated to the level of user activity.
Zigbee monitoring. There are a number of works that
discuss attacks on the the Zigbee Light Link standard. A
few examples are [25], [28] and [24]. However, the fo-
cus of these is more on active attacks. Dos and Lauradox
[15] explored a passive approach where they used the killer-
bee framework and Wireshark to sniff communication in a
Zigbee mesh network. Their motivation is similar to the
IoTScanner since they also aim to construct the topology of
the Zigbee network and find privacy leaks. However, their
work was conducted on a platform of motes they developed,
while we focused on analyzing commercial IoT devices.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the IoTScanner, a system that
Table 4: Proposed IoTScanner Features vs Related
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can passively scan and analyze an IoT environment. We de-
scribed the architecture and implementation details of our
system. The IoTScanner currently scans WiFi, Bluetooth
Low Energy and Zigbee traffic. It can analyze the traf-
fic to provide an overview of the devices that are active in
the environment and the communication among them. We
conducted experiments to evaluate the performance of the
IoTScanner in WiFi, BLE and Zigbee environments.
We introduced a simple ratio analysis of sent-to-receive
traffic that can classify WiFi enabled devices in an active
IoT environment, which can potentially contribute to the
privacy related issues of a personalized IoT environment.
In our experiments, we showed that we were able to iden-
tify actively streaming cameras in our environment. Out
of 95 device classifications, our system had 3 false positives
(FAR=3.61%) and 2 false negatives (FRR=16.67%).
In future work, we aim to incorporate more types of IoT
devices into our experiments and introduce advanced analyt-
ics to classify the devices based on link layer traffic. We are
also interested in enhancing the BLE and Zigbee capabilities
of the IoTScanner.
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